~partition into agr_tpc & agr_dsn ~Thinktank cpx, Aggressor sco, 9-square mod, Partisan (?Elite Brigade, etc.) opt ~"thinktank"= outgrowth/ variation of classic/ archetype "Battleship", "Stratego" games of hidden information abstractions (& see historical notes below) elaborated by Ogre/ GEV refinements, combat resolution simplifications ~aggressor of "casus belli" [NL occassion of war]: a cause or petext for declaration of war AGGRESSOR BACKGROUND "Aggressor" is a wargame about a wargame ("I see wheels within wheels." -Dune: mired in the deep stuff). Before 1976, the term 'Aggressor' was a made- up name assigned by the United States Army to represent a theoretical enemy body against which they could practice fighting in their training exercises and field maneuvers. The Army made an effort to provide such simulated forces- in- name- only with some kind of characteristic identity, by compiling a large assemblage of written details describing non- existent types of weapons, equipment, uniforms & behavior that were supposed to be in use by this enemy. Although much of this material was modeled on Soviet- bloc information, a lot of it was obscure and tended to cause observers to assess such an enemy as fictitious, rather than conjectural as desired. At the same time, Aggressor operations normally depicted a grand scale sort of engagement; where information might be carefully considered and positions might be laboriously taken up prior to the initiation of action. When the Army came to be more concerned with small unit & irregular style ground battles, the kind of timing and organization associated with Aggressor elements began to be seen as unrealistic, or outdated. The inclination to currency and realism spelled the end of Aggressor when, in 1976, the pretense of a generic, non- definitive military enemy was discarded, and Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations pointedly referred to the intended counterpart as "the forces of the Warsaw Pact". Since then, this practical enemy for training became known by the appelation: OPFOR (Opposing Forces). Besides the name change, the newer emphasis on OPFOR resulted in a conceptual shift in tactical doctrine and training to fight (~a shift in management vs process). Aggressor had been principally a G2 (Intelligence) playing field [~playground], whose object was directed toward analysis of structured organizational tables & acquisition of strategic information in order to guess the status of units encountered, what plans the enemy might be forming, & to anticipate the employment of heavy weapons. OPFOR became oriented to the G3 (Operations) side with the accent on recognition of characteristic formations, observance of limited concentration of forces, adherence to the precept of continual offensive & importance for quick transfer of combat information; so governing rapid tactical responses and expectations for operational support. ~CPX exercises replaced by NTC & its leading elements emphasis - G2 relegated to Scouts & Forward Observer/ Target Aquisition using remotely- piloted drones, SigInt This game attempts to recreate the tenor of an Aggressor battlefield situation of yesteryear: it may act as a somewhat provoking experience for students of military science, or as a simple illustration of theme, for those not so absorbed. It might even prove pertinent for a rehearsal of broad- front conventional maneuvers, should such things still be anticipated. Additional comments on the relationships presented, with topics for further study, as well as an indication of the primary focus of the game, are to be found after the game instructions. GAME FOCUS ~combined arms= concept illustrated & game's most useful aspect - attempts to demonstrate employment of (not simply recognition of) combined arms concepts [teamwork, "assets"], vs a "combined arms R Us" assumption/ self- satisfaction, as in "13th CAA" (Combined Arms Army) from Aggressor OB, or blitzkrieg ideal vs "blitz" on London (see armored fist/ screaming waves of dive bombers misuse below): note "how to combine" can't be taken too far/ to excess/ micromanaged (implementation, vs arms used as implements) ex. failure of highly coordinated saturation/ area bombing, artillery, close air support in Cobra operation - mechanism= attachment (mention favored status of OpCon term; modern "decentralized" arms (combined arms extrapolated) is equiv to purpose of bygone OpCon) vs detachment ("flexibility") of OPFOR (NTC), "alliance" (Agr) vs "coalition" (OPFOR eg. Fulda Gap module) task force, battle group (borrowed from Navy (vs flotilla)?) Unit Types for Combined Arms employment: ~Armor= greatest effectiveness as exploitation tool/ arm, vs blitzkrieg spearhead: if massed in forward attack positions IAW initial impression/ inclination, will be bogged (opposed)/ ground down (as Battle of Bulge, Russian front) - preferred use is follow through after engineered penetration/ breakthrough by other forces (drawing enemy into manageable concentrations) - armor's advantage is in its flexibility to turn & move at high pace at an angle to the front, rather than in its directly forward impact (ie. deliver a blow where not expected, rather than where most obvious: especially in view of modern anti-tank capabilities, as contrasting tactics in Arab- Israeli war); Since the demonstration of effectiveness at the National Training Center, any Tank Girl can tell you that the use of cover & concealment (how does one hide a big, noisy tank?) in maneuver is more important than employment of formation precepts - but, catering to the desire to indulge in a stand- up slugfest realized in a tank- heavy environment is what makes the SF- variety of wargame (Ogre/ GEV, Terminator futuristic, Mechwarrior, Hammer's Slammers, even some realistic wargame scenarios/ modules for tank- to- tank battles) so attractive and popular Partisan contact criterion= choose to use Partisan Contact special ability (ie. began turn in enemy territory, not moved qualifications): probability of accumulating a contact is (5-(unit's attack strength))*10%. Attack strength for Missile unit=4, Tech unit=1. Strength is basic, not adjusted. - Collins Atlas of the Second World War, 2003 Times Books/ Borders Press/ Harper Collins, p.124 (re: Kursk): "The Soviet use of partisans in close coordination with main forces in this way was more effective than the Western Allies' use of resistance movements." ? GAME COMPONENTS Map: Zen rock garden- type bare look, vs ordinary profusion of distracting landforms Scale: dimensions and unit compositions are very abstract, especially due to the apparent spacing of contour lines; but principally are: Unit= Bn Hex= 5 km Turn= 6 hr (after Aggressor determined; indeterminate prior) ~die- pattern hex directional coding: spiral/ zig- zag arrangement is essentially equivalent to NEWS (N=1 E=2 W=3 S=4 in square) pattern, since it produces the same relative positioning, just rotated one step Military Intelligence - how to get it Intelligence functions in the military comprise one of the five staff- level offices: Personnel being G1/ S1, Intelligence G2/ S2, Operations G3/ S3, Logistics G4/ S4 & Civil Affairs G5. This official organization is a practical requirement due to the need for conducting those day- to- day activities of post assignments, such as security clearance/ classified documents (clerks & jerks), counterintelligence/ criminal investigation division (spooks), communications security & signal intelligence (snoops) ~Special Forces also incl Intel specialty - when deployment occurs, intelligence- trained personnel revert to their field duties (that's who's minding the store) - staff org contributes to perception of MI as oxymoron & more reliance on information- gathering agencies ~battlefield information processing functions fall into 3 categories: combat (or field) intelligence, order of battle (or force) intelligence and operational intelligence OB: The predictive question: "What will the enemy do?" is hard to nail down, and in general an answer must be derived from implications based on direct observation, thus becoming the more short- term: "What is the enemy doing/ up to?", when what he's up to is for the most part problematic & unindicative of future plans. More susceptible to perception as trends are the questions: A) "What does the enemy want to do?", and B) "What can the enemy do?". In fact, these two points are those of primary interest to the person being briefed, who is charged with far- reaching considerations in the design of his own opposing operational plan. ~what enemy wants partially includes how much we know about how much the enemy knows about us ~?concept of "Staging" - in Aggressor, OPFOR, etc. ~OPFOR follow- up game mechanics: addition of more typical wargame CRT functions: eg. forced retreat, disruption/ suppression, conversion (to non- tech or irregular type) - apply (2- way?) "axis of (unit) operation" (vs 1- way "vector"?): applies to ex. being attacked from direction moved away from results in lessening of likelihood of hit (or bonus to hit in forced retreat?)